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This Article explores the relationship between international law, de-
fined broadly as the principles, norms, and rules governing the
international order and the aspirations for collective self-government by
minority national communities. It argues that there will be increasing
challenges to the current international legal rules by minority national-
ists, and that it is important to develop a principled response to this
challenge. It also argues that the current system privileges state actors to
a great extent, and that any attempt to channel self-determination claims
in a more benign, non-secessionist direction needs to address the state-
centric biases of the current rules.
The argument of this Article proceeds by examining a fairly domi-
nant view of the appropriate relationship between international law and
ethical arguments, and, related to this, the inconsistencies of the current
international law regime with respect to minority nationalist claims to
self-determination. Part Two examines the normative argument underly-
ing minority nationalist claims to self-determination. The upshot of these
two Parts is the conclusion that claims made by and on behalf of minor-
ity nationalists are not likely to wither away, and that the current ad hoc
method of dealing with them is profoundly unsatisfactory. In the third
Part of the Article, two dominant approaches to dealing with self-
determination claims, without secession, are examined in relation to the
• Department of Political Studies, Queen's University (Kingston, Canada). The au-
thor would like to thank Tony Cole for his helpful paper and for encouraging her to write this
Article, John McGarry for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this Article, and
the Carnegie Corporation for a research grant, which funded the research on which this Article
is based.
1. By minority national communities, I am referring to nations without a state, but
who live within another state, dominated by another national group or groups. Examples of
such groups are Kurds in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq; Catalans, Basques, and Galicians in Spain;
the Scots and Welsh in the U.K.; Quebec in Canada; and numerous other groups in all parts of
the world.
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current lack of support by the international legal order. The Article con-
cludes by arguing that we should expect demands for self-determination
and conflicts between majority and minority nations to continue until
there are changes in the international legal order which undermines the
current statist status quo and which makes more likely the exercise of
collective self-government by minority nations.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MINORITY
NATIONALIST SELF-DETERMINATION2
There are at least two rival conceptions of international law, demar-
cated according to their different views of the appropriate relationship
between law and morals.3 The dominant conception of international law,
arguably stemming from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia settlement, which
ended the Thirty Years War, is that of a system of minimal rules centered
on the mutual recognition of state sovereignty.4 This settlement is com-
monly viewed as a modus vivendi among the various parties to the Thirty
Years War not to interfere in one another's territories or internal matters.5
There are a number of elements implicit in this view of international
relations and the rules that should govern it. At the heart of the West-
phalian settlement is a principle of the absoluteness of state sovereignty.
All the other rules that later developed into a system of international law
are based on the acceptance of myriad state authorities and power rela-
6tions .
The ethical merits of this system rest on the claim that a system
based on respecting state sovereignty is necessary to maintain order and
2. The argument of the first half of Part One of this Article is drawn from my book,
MARGARET MOORE, THE ETHICS OF NATIONALISM 165-201 (2001).
3. Andrew Hurrell, International Law and the Making and Unmaking of Borders, in
STATES, NATIONS, AND BORDERS 275-297 (Allen Buchanan & Margaret Moore eds., 2003). In
this article, Hurrell identifies three images of international law. I have adapted his typology.
What he refers to as the "pluralist statist" image, I call here the "Westphalian" system.
4. I am neutral on the issue of whether the 1648 Peace of Westphalia settlement con-
stituted a dramatic break with the system in place or whether it merely consolidated a number
of moves made over a period of time in international relations. For the latter view, see
CHARLES TILLEY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 990-1992, 166-67
(1990).
5. This does not bear on the debate between Daniel Philpott and Stephen Krasner
concerning the meaning of the Peace of Westphalia settlement, since it is not part of my argu-
ment here to consider what in practice this settlement means, only that it is commonly
identified with a particular image of the appropriate relation between moral and religious
commitments and boundaries. For a clear discussion of the importance of the Westphalian
model in the development of international relations, see Daniel Philpott, Sovereignty: An In-
troduction and Brief History, 48 J. INT'L AFF. 353, 353-68 (1995). For a rival view of the
impact of that event, see STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
6. See Hurrell, supra note 3.
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stability. The guiding intuition here is that it is better to permit injustices
and evils within domestic states than to allow domestic matters to serve
as a pretext or justification for intervention, for there will then be no end
to war and strife. This view presupposes two further claims. The first,
empirical claim is that there is no consensus, or common ground, on
more substantive issues. The most that can be hoped for is coexistence
based on the allocation of jurisdictional authority. The second related
claim is that the system has the virtue of permitting many different kinds
of societies to coexist. It is therefore a framework for liberty and plural-
ism.
The minimalist rules vision of international law implicit above, and
often associated with the Westphalian order, has increasingly been chal-
lenged by a more solidarist conception of international law, which has
been on the ascendant throughout the twentieth century. This rival, soli-
darist view is characterized by an emphasis on substantive norms and
values to govern international society, rather than mere coexistence.
Sometimes these solidarist values have been pursued by states acting
together; at other times, they have been pursued through international
institutions, such as the United Nations. In both cases, there have been
attempts to cultivate common values, such as the promotion of human
rights or democratic governance. In other areas too, broader understand-
ings and increased co-operation have been viewed as necessary to deal
with common global interests-to manage the global economy or to deal
with environmental problems or international crime.
This solidarist vision is a direct challenge to the view associated
with the Westphalian system and especially the primacy of the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of states. In a number of cases, which are typi-
cally viewed as evidence of this increasing push to a solidarist vision of
the rules governing international society, the United Nations has inter-
vened in the domestic affairs of states. These states include Somalia,
Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, East Timor, and others.
Intervention has not been applied generally, and has not always been
entirely successful, but in these cases, the intervention was not solely
motivated by the self-interest of the most powerful states, but was at
least partly aimed at either preventing a humanitarian disaster or grave
injustices; and these humanitarian aims were viewed, at least in those
cases, as outweighing the norm of the sovereignty of the states con-
cerned.
This solidarist vision is at the heart of minority nationalist claims
that the rules governing the international state system should be changed.
At one level, of course, the appeal is not for a new rule but for the rule
regarding state sovereignty to be applied more generally to include all
Summer 20041 1321
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national groups. However, in order for that to be effective, there need to
be changes to other rules in the system, and increased support for non-
secessionist types of self-determination.
There are at least two kinds of reasons why we can expect the chal-
lenge that minority nations pose to the international state system, and the
rules governing this system, to continue. The first reason is connected to
the process by which international law is made and international norms
become recognized and institutionalized. This process is dominated, not
by overt power, but by discussion. In many cases, international norms
emerge from a broad consensus among state actors-no doubt of course
this consensus is disproportionately affected by the more powerful
states-but it is still a consensus forged through discussion and the giv-
ing of reasons, not overt threats and coercion. The process by which
international law is made-and especially the space that it provides for
discussion and debate-means that it will always be a site of contesta-
tion. It will be a political space in which different moral and self-
interested visions compete with one another to shape the institutional
structure of international society.
Moreover, the sharp distinction between law and norms that is im-
plicit in the Westphalian model is extremely problematic, both in theory
and in practice. International law is not something independent of norms,
but institutionalizes the norms of the international system. It empowers
some international actors, while disempowering others. For example, the
principle of absolute state sovereignty is itself a norm, which privileges
state actors and marginalizes non-state actors, such as national commu-
nities and non-governmental agencies, and so on. Because international
law is itself a system of institutionalized norms-indeed, it is the only
set of global institutionalized norms-there is hope on the part of na-
tional minorities that international law can be brought to bear on
oppressive states.
It is not only the process by which international law is made that fu-
els the pressure by minorities for changes in the international legal
regime, but also its content. Specifically, international law is riddled with
ethical contradictions and incoherence, many of which are the result of
compromises between principles and political practice, or between the
two rival conceptions of international law canvassed here. These contra-
dictions create space to challenge the current norms, or to use some
norms of international law to challenge others.
The contradictions are of course embedded in the United Nations
Charter itself, which states its commitment both to human rights and to
1322 [Vol. 25:1319
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the sovereignty of States.7 The contradictions with respect to the princi-
ple of self-determination in international law and political practice since
1945 have been extensively documented,' but, like a commitment to any
other substantive norm, it runs directly up against the commitment to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. The right to "self-
determination of peoples" is endorsed in the U.N. Charter.9 This princi-
ple has of course potentially far-reaching consequences, and so, is
qualified by numerous other articles in the U.N. Charter affirming the
sanctity of the principle of the territorial integrity of States and denying
the right of the United Nations or its Member States to intervene in the
internal affairs of recognized States.' ° For example, the 1970 U.N. Dec-
laration regarding the right of secession makes it clear that the United
Nations condemns "any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of
the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country.""
In 1970, U.N. Secretary General U Thant argued that the recognition of a
State by the international community and its acceptance into the United
Nations implied acceptance of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. He
added, "the United Nations' attitude is unequivocable. As an interna-
tional organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not
accept and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession
of a part of its Member State."' 2
The main strategy adopted by the Member States and the United Na-
tions to limit the potentially destabilizing scope of the principle of self-
determination is to narrowly define the right-holders. Thus, the right to
self-determination has been qualified by a whole series of resolutions
passed by sovereign States, concerned about the potentially destructive
effects for them of this principle. The main effect of this is to make it
clear that the "peoples" in question are not national groups, but rather
peoples within territorial states; and that the right to self-determination
could only be invoked by people under colonial rule or people living
7. MARIANNE HEIBERG, SUBDUING SOVEREIGNTY: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHTS TO
INTERVENE 9 (1994);
8. See ROSEMARY HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
How WE USE IT 111-28 (1994).Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459,
459-76 (1971); Alexis Heraclides, Secession, Self-Determination and Non-Intervention: In
Quest of a Normative Symbiosis, 45 J. INT'L AFF. 399, 399-420 (1992); Brendan O'Leary,
Determining Our Selves: On the Norm of National Self-Determination, Paper Presented to the
International Political Science Association (Aug. XX, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Michigan Journal of International Law/author).
9. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 2; Id. art. 55.
10. See Emerson, supra note 8, at 463.
11. ALEXIS HERACLIDES, THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF MINORITIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS 21 (1991).
12. Emerson, supra note 8, at 46 (quoting U.N. Secretary General U Thant, who spoke
in the context of the attempted secession by Biafra of Nigeria).
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under alien or racist regimes-Palestinians under Israeli occupations or
blacks under apartheid in South Africa, respectively.
The strategy of narrowing the right to self-determination to certain
classes of right-holders is both unconvincing and ethically problematic.'3
It is difficult to justify why the right to self-determination of people liv-
ing under colonial rule can only be exercised once to restore sovereignty
to the people, who had been illegitimately deprived of it by the colonial
power, but can never be used again.14 This makes sense in terms of the
political interests of sovereign States who are concerned about their ter-
ritorial integrity, but certainly not to unhappy national groups inside
these States who question the legitimacy of the States.
In summary, the moral idea justifying both democracy and decoloni-
zation is surely that political power should be in the hands of the people
over whom it is exercised. This provides some basis for condemning
States dominated by a particular national group that exercises power and
control over another national group. It might be "politically correct" to
describe only Western powers that control overseas territories as "impe-
rialists" but it is not factually correct. The term "imperialism" can be
coherently and persuasively applied to any attempt by one people to
dominate politically another people, especially if the latter perceive the
rule to be hostile to their national identity.
Whatever one might think of the reasons for the current international
legal treatment of the self-determination of minority nations, it is widely
accepted that the various principles are confusing and contradictory, and
that the international community's response when faced with minority
rebellion tends to be disturbingly ad hoc and so not facilitative of either
stability or peace. The idea of national self-determination has profound
resonance across the globe, and it is necessary to elaborate ways of deal-
ing with the national dimension of these conflicts, so that a peaceful
solution can be achieved.
II. THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF MINORITY NATIONALISM
Minority nations challenge the assumed coincidence between politi-
cally significant identities and political boundaries. At least since the 18"'
Century, when conceptions of democracy and self-determination first
reared their head, it was assumed that the borders of the State would cor-
respond to politically significant identities-that States would be nation-
states. This does not necessarily mean that they would be culturally ho-
13. See discussion infra Part II.
14. See O'Leary, supra note 8, at 3.
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mogenous, but that, at the minimum, the territory of the State would co-
incide with a political identity of the people as constituting a single,
sovereign nation, to which the democratic political system was, ideally,
ultimately accountable. Many people assumed that, to achieve this, cul-
tural difference would need to be eradicated. Jean Jacques Rousseau, for
example, in one of the earliest discussions of the need to create a "na-
tion"-a people who identified with each other and with the territory or
"homeland"-thought that this required a uniform education in the his-
tory and culture of the society to inculcate the necessary feelings of
social solidarity.I5 The coercive policies to achieve linguistic and cultural
homogeneity in France to create a single French nation16 attest to the fear
and concern that cultural difference would translate into political differ-
ence; that, to achieve the national dream and a shared political identity,
cultural differences would need to be eliminated.
The existence, and persistence, of minority national identities have
almost from the beginning, challenged the territorial and institutional
framework associated with democratic self-government. Minority na-
tions pose a challenge to the conception of popular sovereignty, and
especially the assumption that popular sovereignty is indeed popular. 7
For members of national minorities, the exercise of undifferentiated ma-
joritarian rule within a single State-wide political community is
enormously problematic, because they constitute minorities who can be
consistently outvoted, and whose aspirations and identities are denied in
unified sovereign states.
The existence of minority nations also challenges the principle or
right of self-determination, which is thought to accompany political
15. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 136 (G.D.H.
Cole et al. eds. & trans., 1973). The relevant passage from A Discourse on Political Economy
reads:
If children are brought up in common ... imbued with the laws of the State and the
precepts of the general will; if they are taught to respect these above all things; if
they are surrounded by examples and objects which constantly remind them of the
tender mother who nourishes them, of the love she bears them, of the inestimable
benefits they receive from her, and of the return they owe her, we cannot doubt that
they will learn to cherish one another mutually as brothers, to will nothing contrary
to the will of society.., and to become in time defenders and fathers of the country
of which they will have been so long the children.
Id.
16. EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF RURAL
FRANCE, 1870-1914 (1976).
17. For an interesting discussion of the very close relationship between nationalism and
democracy, see LIAH GREENFELD, NATIONALISM: FIVE ROADS TO MODERNITY 9-11 (1992). In
addition to laying out a general and theoretical account of the relationship, Greenfeld de-
scribes the different forms that the relationship took in England, France, Russia, Germany, and
America. Id.
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self-government and to be important at least since the demise of the
norm of imperial rule. This challenge can be easily seen through distin-
guishing between two conceptions of "the people" who are entitled to be
self-determining. On the conception of "peoples" as majorities within
political units, the issue of what is the relevant territorial unit is crucial,
for the territory essentially defines who counts as the people. On the eth-
nic or linguistic conception of "the peoples" who are entitled to be self-
determining, the ethnic identity of "the peoples" defines where the
boundaries should be drawn. These two conceptions, obviously, do not
coincide, and the possibility of conflict and disaffection is very real. In-
deed, the principle of self-determination is unproblematic only in the
rare and ideal case that the administrative boundary coincides with the
ethnic or national group; the group is territorially concentrated, with no
significant minorities; and the members of the group are strongly mobi-
lized in favor of self-determination. Most cases fall far short of that
ideal, although Iceland is a rare exception, in which both definitions of
the "people" (those resident in the administrative boundaries of the unit,
and those who are members of the nation) happen to coincide. But in
most cases, the definitions of "the people" and the territorial units in
which self-determination is to occur are contested, and the possibility of
alienated minorities within the state, stranded minorities on the other
side of the border, contested homelands, and mobilized unionist groups
against the possible exercise of self-determination (e.g., secession) are
very real indeed.
Moreover, members of minority nations can legitimately claim that
the current State system is unfair. Like majority nations, they are politi-
cally mobilized, they have a history and a homeland, and they seek to
exercise political self-government. Indeed, they are as capable of being
the bearers of modernity-to exercise democratic governance and to ad-
here to the rules of justice and respect for human rights-as majority
nations. It is a majoritarian fallacy to think that national minorities are
backward, ethnic, and chauvinistic, whereas majority nations are civic
and inclusive, when, in many cases, the terms of the inclusion (into the
majority nation) are unfair and help to jeopardize the communal exis-
tence of the minority group.
National minorities also suffer from other significant forms of un-
fairness. Minority status is clearly a problem when the regime is
discriminatory and even murderous, or when it is a strongly nationaliz-
ing State, intent on privileging---economically or culturally-one
18. See John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary, The Macropolitical Regulation of Ethnic




national group in the territory. However, even in cases where the worst
abuses are avoided, minority status is still a problem. While members of
the majority community feel that the public culture is continuous with
their culture, this is not true of members of the minority nation. The lan-
guage that a member of a minority nation speaks at home and in her
community is not the language of the state; typically, she must acquire
facility in a second language, and ensure that her children acquire a sec-
ond language, to have good jobs in the political and economic spheres.
She may be disadvantaged in numerous ways, often unintentional, by the
laws, procedures, and public life of the state, which reflect the culture,
history, and traditions of the majority community.
Moreover, this person is acutely aware of her minority status. Unlike
members of the majority community, who can be individuals in the sense
that they are regarded as individuals, she is always regarded as an Other,
as a member of the minority group. In cases where there has been his-
toric enmity between the minority and majority group, minority status
may carry with it a certain amount of physical insecurity, especially in
the context of the breakdown of state order. In addition to the economic
and insecurity implications of minority status, and the potential for dis-
crimination and prejudice, there is significant psychological loss, in so
far as the minority identity is denied or rejected. This has been well
documented with respect to various groups in Central Europe in the pe-
riod following the First World War. With the collapse of the German and
Austro-Hungarian Empire, Hungarians found themselves converted from
majority to minority status in Romania, Serbia, and Czechoslovakia.
Germans in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Denmark found themselves
similarly converted from majority to minority status. The psychological
loss associated with this transition is not just the notion of being trans-
ferred from dominant status to being dominated, but the psychological
loss that accompanies the denial of their aspiration to be a political
community. Nor is this loss simply connected to cultural or linguistic
issues, or to economic consequences of minority culture and language. A
significant problem is that the border, or more precisely where the border
is drawn, denies their aspirations to be a politically self-governing com-
munity. There is a sense of unfairness associated with this, for the border
permits some groups to be collectively self-governing, to have institu-
tional expression of their identity as members of a specific political
community, but denies it to national minorities.
Despite the moral persuasiveness of their claim that the current na-
tion-state structure is unfair, it is very difficult to respond to minority
nationalist concerns. This is because one response, and often the re-
sponse that minority nationalists seek, is to redraw political boundaries,
Summer 2004] 1327
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but such territorial reconfigurations would be extremely costly and dis-
ruptive, and would not, in any case, completely get rid of the problem.' 9
Most critics of nationalism have also made these points. Ernest Gellner
argued that there are at least 8,000 groups in the world that are potential
nations, according to his linguistic criterion of "potential nation." Con-
ferring a right to national self-determination on each of them, and
redrawing territorial boundaries, if and when they developed a national
consciousness, would be extremely destabilizing and counter-productive,
leading possibly to civil war and bloodshed." One of the most often
cited quotes by critics of nationalism concerning the redrawing of
boundaries is associated with Robert Lahnsing, Woodrow Wilson's sec-
retary of state. Lahnsing complained that Wilson should never have
uttered the phrase "self-determination," a phrase "simply loaded with
dynamite. It will raise hopes, which can never be realized. It will, I fear,
cost thousands of lives."" Most critics of national self-determination cite
this passage from Lahnsing approvingly, although with the caveat that
Lahnsing seriously under-estimated the costs involved."- It is, however,
misleading to suggest that the problem of "national self-determination"
arose because Woodrow Wilson uttered an "unfortunate phrase." The
problem was not created by the ill-considered phrasing of a single per-
son. The problem is inherent in the structure of the nation-State system:
minorities are responding to their disadvantaged position within that
structure, and expressing their legitimate aspirations to persist as their
own particular community and to be collectively self-governing.
This leads us to the uncomfortable realization that, on the one hand,
national minorities have legitimate claims of fairness, or justice, but that
these cannot be met because of legitimate concerns about peace and se-
curity. If this were right, it would mean not only that we have prioritized
stability considerations over justice, but that we have sacrificed some
groups and some peoples so that we can all live in a more stable world.
Moreover, because "stability" is purchased at the cost of justice, and mi-
norities are mobilized around the justice of their cause, there is always
the potential for instability, minority disaffection, and even secessionist
mobilization to rear its head.
19. For a discussion of the problem in drawing boundaries, see John McGarry, Orphans
of Secession, in NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 215-232 (Margaret Moore
ed., 1998).
20. See ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 44-45 (1983).
21. Sanford Levinson, Is Liberal Nationalism an Oxymoron?, 105 ETHICS 626, 631
(1995).
22. Id.; see also Ronald S. Beiner, Self-Determination and Rights, in NATIONAL SELF-
DETERMINATION AND SECESSION, supra note 19, at 158, 175 n.9.
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Concerns about national minorities-and the potential challenge that
they pose to the nation-State system-are not new. Indeed, it was per-
haps best understood when, after the First World War, the Boundaries
Commission was established to carve up new national states from the
ruins of the Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires.
It was soon renamed the Boundaries and Minorities Commission, and its
ambit was extended to consider the fate of minorities, because it was
clear that the creation of boundaries also created minorities.23 The Mi-
nority Rights Treaties were a response to the awareness that boundaries
were not equally beneficial to all groups, and that there should be some
attempt to remedy (admittedly unavoidable) unfairness and to assuage
minority concerns and grievances. The solution was to create institu-
tional procedures and structures that would deal with the worst forms of
unfairness. That institutional structure was, as is now almost universally
recognized, flawed and susceptible to abuse24-- but this does not impugn
the general idea underlying the treaties. This idea was, essentially, that
boundaries create minorities, minorities suffer disadvantages, and there
should be some protection afforded to minorities by the international
community.
III. NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT SECESSION
The arguments in the two Parts above suggest that the idea of na-
tional self-determination has profound resonance across the globe, and it
is useful to develop a principled response to minority nationalist aspira-
tions for collective self-government.
In this Part, I will consider two likely methods of dealing with na-
tionalist aspirations: the first is offering minority national communities
cultural rights, or non-territorial autonomy, within existing states; the
second is more robust forms of territorial autonomy, such as federal ar-
rangements or international autonomy regimes.
This Part of the Article argues that non-territorial autonomy-while
currently the most likely to be offered-is unlikely to be satisfactory to
minority nationalists. The second is less likely to be on offer by states,
but is more likely to satisfy the minority nationalists' aspirations, espe-
cially if it is accompanied by robust international protection
mechanisms.
23. See generally JENNIFER JACKSON PREECE, NATIONAL MINORITIES AND THE EURO-
PEAN NATION-STATES SYSTEM (1998).
24. Jackson Preece details the flaws in the Minorities Rights Treaties, and how the
process contributed to this abuse. Id. at 67-94.
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A. Non-Territorial Autonomy
One of the most popular recent proposals for dealing with national
minorities is to offer them cultural rights, or autonomy over certain func-
tions of importance to them, which recognize their different culture andS • 25
identity. This form of autonomy is also referred to in the political sci-
ence literature as "cultural autonomy," "segmental autonomy"'
"functional autonomy," "corporate autonomy," and "corporate federal-
ism.
,,26
This type of institutional mechanism has a long and venerable his-
tory. Non-territorial autonomy was used by the Ottomans originally to
manage religious diversity.27 From the fifteenth century, Greek Orthodox,
Armenian Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim communities administered their
own affairs in religion, education, and family law. With the growth of
national sentiment, these religious millets later split into linguistically
based units.2" An equivalent of the millet, the kahal, was introduced in
the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, where it was used to give
autonomy to the Jewish community. The millet system has contributed to
the current legal systems in India, Israel, and Lebanon where different
religious communities have autonomy over family law. In most western
liberal-democratic jurisdictions, non-territorial autonomy for religious
communities is generally restricted, as in Canada and the United King-
dom, to limited control over their own publicly-funded school system.
A significant application of non-territorial autonomy occurred in in-
ter-war Estonia where a Cultural Autonomy Law was passed in 1925.
The law enabled ethnic groups numbering at least 3,000 to establish cul-
tural councils capable of taxing the groups' members and exercising
jurisdiction over a wide range of cultural activities, including education,
culture, libraries, theatres, museums, and sports. 29 Cyprus' consociational
constitution of 1960 also provided for non-territorial autonomy for the
interspersed Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. These were given
25. Autonomy should be distinguished from mere regional self-administration (where
regions implement policies decided by central governments) and from local/municipal gov-
ernment (where there is only a capacity to pass minor regulations or by-laws). It should also
be distinguished from sham varieties of "autonomy" associated with control strategies, such as
when a state devolves power to co-opted and unrepresentative elites, concedes the form of
autonomy without the substance, or imposes autonomy on groups that do not want it.
26. AREND LIuPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS
GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES 183-85 (1984).
27. John Coakley, Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The Strategy of
Non-Territorial Autonomy, 15 INT'L POL. Sci. REv. 297, 299 (1994).
28. Jean Laponce, The Government of Dispersed Minorities: From Constantinople to
Ottawa, in DIVIDED NATIONS 62 (Tamas Kozma & Peter Drahos eds., 1993).
29. Coakley, supra note 27, at 307.
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separately elected communal chambers with exclusive legislative powers
30over religious, educational, and cultural matters.
The demise of Marxism-Leninism in Eastern Europe has led to re-
surgence in the popularity of non-territorial autonomy. Unlike Lenin, the
new rulers of the region appear to view it as preferable to what they see
as more dangerous and destabilizing forms of territorial autonomy. In
1993, Estonia re-introduced its inter-war arrangements for non-territorial
autonomy. In the same year, Hungary passed an Act On the Rights of• • 31
National and Ethnic Minorities. In 1996, the Russian parliament
adopted the National Cultural Autonomy Act, which allows individuals
to form National Cultural Associations with rights over culture, lan-
guage, education, and the media as well as the right to represent the
interests of minorities in State (federal, republic and local) institutions.
By mid 1999, 227 National Cultural Associations (NCAs) had been reg-
istered (160 local, 60 regional and 7 federal).32 Other non-territorial
autonomy arrangements have been implemented in Ukraine, for Rus-
sians in eastern Ukraine and for Hungarians in Transcarpathia.
3
The normative arguments for non-territorial autonomy arrangements
most frequently employed by state elites are of the peace and stability
sort. They involve a negative judgment about the secessionist dangers of
territorial autonomy, while recognizing the need to go some way to ac-
commodating the linguistic, ethnic, or religious diversity of the
population. Estonia, Slovakia, and Croatia have all rejected schemes of
territorial autonomy, but have implemented schemes of non-territorial
autonomy. Israel's Menachem Begin was also prepared to consider cul-
tural autonomy, but not territorial autonomy, for the Palestinian citizens
of Israel. In Russia, where there is a system of territorial autonomy, crit-
ics promoted non-territorial autonomy as an alternative or at least as a
countervailing force. The first politician to recommend it in the post-
communist era, Gavril Popov, linked it to a proposal for scrapping Rus-
sia's system of ethno-federalism and restoring the Tsarist system of
ethnically neutral administrative regions.34 Some have speculated that the
30. See AREND L1JPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 159 (1977) ("[T]hese
provisions went far toward setting up a 'federal' system without actual territorial federalism,
which was thwarted by the highly interspersed residential patterns of the two populations.").
31. Andrea Krizsdn, The Hungarian Minority Protection System: A Flexible Approach
to the Adjudication of Ethnic Claims, 26 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 247, 248 (2000).
32. Cristiano Codagnone & Vassily Fillipov, Equity, Exit and National Identity in a
Multinational Federation: The "Multicultural Constitutional Patriotism" Project in Russia,
26 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 263, 280 (2000).
33. Will Kymlicka, Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe,
in CAN LIBERAL PLURALISM BE EXPORTED? WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY AND ETHNIC RE-
LATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE 68 (Will Kymlicka & Magda Opalski eds., 2001).
34. Codagnone & Fillipov, supra note 32, at 275.
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country's adoption of "national cultural autonomy" is aimed at replacing
ethno-federalism over the long run.35 The idea that non-territorial auton-
omy will suffice as a way to manage the concerns of national minorities
has become, apparently, a "veritable mantra" among East European in-
tellectuals .36
These arguments are not restricted to Eastern Europeans. Western
states have also expressed a preference for non-territorial autonomy in
Eastern Europe because of concerns about stability or because, as in
France and Greece, they fear that accommodation through territorial
autonomy will give rise to similar demands from their own minorities.
Since the Copenhagen Document of 1990 suggested territorial autonomy
as an option for the accommodation of minorities, there has been a
steady retreat of support for it in international documents, in part as a
result of the conflicts arising from the breakup of Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union. These documents are now more likely to stress non-
territorial methods of accommodation than the territorial sort.37 The
OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities has recently warned
minority groups that:
Even though the [OSCE's] Copenhagen Document mentions ter-
ritorial autonomy as an option, minorities should take into
account the fact that such a demand will probably meet maxi-
mum resistance, whereas they might be able to achieve more if
they concentrated on legislation that enabled them to have a
greater say in fields of special interest to them, such as education
and culture.38
35. See Paul Goble, A New Kind of Autonomy, in RFEIRL RUSSIAN FEDERATION RE-
PORT, Vol. 2, no. 17 (Julie A. Corwin ed., May 10, 2000). Valery Tishkov, a leading Russian
academic and head of the State Committee on Nationalities (in 1992), promoted non-territorial
autonomy because he thought it would strengthen a statewide civic nationalist identity. See
Magda Opalski, Can Will Kymlicka be Exported to Russia?, in CAN LIBERAL PLURALISM BE
EXPORTED? WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE,
supra note 33, at 308.
36. Will Kymlicka, Reply and Conclusion, in CAN LIBERAL PLURALISM BE EXPORTED?
WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 33, at
365.
37. International documents that are concerned with protecting minorities have gener-
ally little to say about territorial autonomy. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES (1995), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/157.htm; FOUNDATION ON INTER-ETHNIC
RELATIONS, LUND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL
MINORITIES IN PUBLIC LIFE (1999), available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/
recommendations/lund/index.php.
38. MAX VAN DER STOEL, PEACE AND STABILITY THROUGH HUMAN AND MINORITY
RIGHTS: SPEECHES BY THE OSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL MINORITIES 111-12
(Wofgang Zellner & Falk Lange eds., 1999).
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In the High Commissioner's view, "insufficient attention has been paid
to the possibilities of non-territorial autonomy.' 39 I'he OSCE has been
engaged, apparently, in an "almost ritual invoking of 'non-territorial
autonomy' as a way of accommodating national minorities.4
Non-territorial autonomy has some advantages over territorial
autonomy. First, it is useful for national minorities that are too dispersed
or few in number to exercise or to aspire to territorial autonomy. There is
some evidence that Estonia's inter-war arrangements for non-territorial
autonomy improved the position of its dispersed minorities. In Coakley's
view, "its existence did much to reconcile the Germans to life within the
Estonian state.' Jews also appear to have been happy with Estonia's
autonomy arrangements. Dispersed groups, like the Roma of Hungary
and Russia, stand to benefit from those countries' arrangements for non-
territorial autonomy, as these will provide the Roma with institutions and
resources that they currently lack. In Canada, non-territorial autonomy
has enabled francophones outside Quebec to maintain some control over
their own schools. The over fifty percent of natives who live in Canada's
cities would also benefit from a scheme of non-territorial autonomy, as it
is difficult to see how plans for giving self-government to native reserves
addresses their situation.42
However, it is probable that such schemes for dispersed minorities,
who do not have the demographic basis to reproduce their culture and
identity, are a way to make assimilation more gentle rather than a way to
stop it.
41
Non-territorial autonomy is also useful in combination with power-
sharing arrangements and territorial autonomy in nationally divided so-
cieties. It is a mechanism that helps minorities to feel that the State is a
State that belongs to them, that the public culture, symbols, and charac-
ter of the State also include them. Many consociational or power-sharing
systems-in Belgium, the Netherlands and Lebanon-have allowed
39. Id. at 172.
40. Kymlicka, supra note 36, at 382.
41. Coakley, supra note 27, at 307. Georg von Rauch wrote that "the Estonian govern-
ment was able to claim, with every justification, that it had found an exemplary solution to the
problem of its minorities." L1JPHART, supra note 26, at 184 (quoting GEORG VON RAUCH, THE
BALTIC STATES-ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA: THE YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1917-
1946 (Gerald Onn trans., 1974)).
42. DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF THE
ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES vol. 4, ch. 7, no. 5 (1996), at http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/index.e.html.
43. This is certainly true for the francophone community outside Quebec. In the case of
Canada's natives, they might be able to retain their identity as native-particularly as they face
racism, and are resistant to adopting the identity of the very people who decimated their cul-
ture, but it is unlikely that they can reproduce their culture in a meaningful way, even with
non-territorial autonomy.
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degrees of non-territorial (or segmental) autonomy to various religious
and secular communities.4 More recently, Belgium has sought to man-
age its ethno-linguistic communities through a mixture of consociational
power-sharing, federal or territorial autonomy, and non-territorial auton-
omy. The French and Flemish language communities have non-territorial
jurisdiction over French and Flemish speakers in Brussels.45 In New Zea-
46land, the Maori Council supervises matters of interest to Maoris. In
Canada, francophone communities outside Quebec and anglophone mi-
norities inside Quebec enjoy control over their own school boards.
It may also be the case that large minorities that are territorially con-
centrated will find non-territorial autonomy better than the alternatives
on offer. The Kurds in Turkey would see such arrangements, which the
European Union is pushing for, and whereby they could control their
own state-funded cultural institutions, as a considerable advance over the
Kemalist regime of coercive assimilation that they have been subjected
to.
It would be wrong to impugn the theory of non-territorial autonomy
by burdening it with the limited forms that the practice has taken, and
thereby suggest that "non-territorial autonomy" must necessarily consist
of the kinds of limited forms of recognition and autonomy on offer in
many cases. For example, the autonomy regimes in Hungary were im-
plemented primarily to promote the benign treatment of Hungarian
minorities in neighboring countries and to polish Hungary's image as a
way of gaining entry into the European Union.47 In Estonia's case, the
non-territorial autonomy scheme for minorities appears to be consistent
with the closing and the defunding by the state of Russian language
schools and other public institutions as part of its nation-building pol-
icy.48 In other cases, the schemes do not appear to offer autonomy at all,
but rather involve the creation of an officially recognised agency to
lobby or advise the government on the minority's behalf.49 While the
Roma in Russia and Hungary may be better off with non-territorial
autonomy than without, their position remains "marginal" in spite of
these reforms.50
44. LIJPHART, supra note 30, at 41-44.
45. LIJPHART, supra note 26, at 184-85.
46. Coakley, supra note 27, at 309.
47. Krizsdn, supra note 31, at 250.
48. See DAVID D. LAITIN, IDENTITY IN FORMATION: THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING POPULA-
TIONS IN THE NEAR ABROAD 94 (1998).
49. Codagnone and Fillipov argue that the influence of National Cultural Associations
in Russian politics has been minimal. Codagnone & Fillipov, supra note 32, at 275.
50. See, e.g., Peter Vermeersch, Romani Political Participation and Racism: Reflections




However, it is highly unlikely that significant and territorially con-
centrated minorities will be satisfied with non-territorial autonomy, even
genuine and generous non-territorial autonomy, particularly if they have
a history of territorial autonomy. There are a number of reasons for this.
The types of powers that such minorities seek, including power over the
economy and policing, and control over population influxes and which
language is dominant, require control over territory. This is connected to
the territorial nature of the modem state, and the fact that the exercise of
its most important functions tends to be on a territorial basis.
Moreover, non-territorial autonomy fails to take into account the vi-
tal relationship that most nations have with their homeland or "national
territory." For many groups, there is a conception of a "homeland," a
geographical area with symbolic and emotional significance, which is
not captured simply by the provision for self-government over members.
This relationship to the land is clearly evident in the discourse of indige-
nous people, but it is true of all national minorities, including Scots,
Catalans, or Uighurs.5 Their aspirations for collective self-government
typically involve a desire to control this land, including its monuments,
cemeteries, churches, as well as access to it. Nationalists seek not simply
self-government, but self-government in and over their national home-
land.52 In part, this is because the most significant functions of
government operate on a territorial basis, and control over territory is
important to the successful reproduction of a group's language and cul-
ture. The contrasting fortunes of linguistic minorities with territorial
autonomy and non-territorial autonomy can be observed by looking at
the Swedes of Finland. The Aland Islanders, who enjoy territorial auton-
omy, including control over demographic influxes, and who have
promoted their language in the public sphere, have been able to ensure
that they are able to reproduce their culture and their identity over time.
By contrast, Swedish speakers on the Finnish mainland, who are
51. See Walker Conner, The Impact of Homelands upon Diasporas, in MODERN DIAS-
PORAS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 16 (Gabriel Sheffer ed., 1986).
52. Think of the case of Irish nationalism. The Irish demand for self-determination has
had relatively little to do with the desire to protect a distinct language or religion. See JOHN
MCGARRY & BRENDAN O'LEARY, EXPLAINING NORTHERN IRELAND: BROKEN IMAGES 207
(1995). It has had more to do with getting the "Brits out" and securing "Ireland for the Irish,"
i.e., with achieving self-determination for the Irish people in Ireland, their "national territory."
Think also of the problem of contested sites such as Kosovo or Jerusalem. These are among
the more intractable disputes in nationalist conflicts, and non-territorial autonomy fails to deal
with them because it abstracts from the territorial dimension of nationalism.
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territorially concentrated and enjoy some language rights, but who lack
territorial autonomy, have not fared nearly as well.53
The argument of this Section of the Article has suggested that non-
territorial autonomy arrangements are unlikely to be satisfactory for
most territorially concentrated national minorities, who seek to be col-
lectively self-governing over significant areas of their collective lives,
and who seek to govern their national homelands. The inadequacy of
most forms of non-territorial autonomy should be evident from the fact
that most national minorities do not seek it, at least not as a first prefer-
ence, and particularly not those minorities that have the demographic
concentration and capacity to exercise territorial self-government.
B. Territorial Autonomy Regimes and the International Order
The previous Section argued that non-territorial autonomy is
unlikely to assuage minority nationalist aspirations to self-government,
and that territorial autonomy is more acceptable to minority nationalists.
This Section considers two distinct forms that territorial autonomy can
take, the limitations of each of them, and the challenges that they pose
for international law.
The most typical method of granting territorial autonomy is to draw
internal boundaries of the federation in such a way that a national or eth-
nic group controls at least some of the states that make up the federation.
In some cases, more than one national group can be explicitly recog-
nized as co-founder of the federation. The first such federation was
Switzerland, founded, in its current form, in 1848. Since then, there have
been a number of others, such as Canada, established in 1867, and the
Indian subcontinent, which was divided after decolonization into the two
multiethnic federations of India and Pakistan. The Communist Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia were federal in structure, al-
though they were not democratic, and the practice of Communist Party
centralism undermined their genuinely federal and decentralized charac-
ter. Belgium has recently evolved into a federation and multinational
federations have been proposed for a number of other divided socie-
ties-from Afghanistan to Cyprus to Iraq and Indonesia.54
A federation, by its very nature, implies a codified or written consti-
tution, a supreme court, and a bicameral legislature. Because the federal
53. Antony Alcock, Finland: The Swedish-Speaking Community, in MINORITIES AND
AUTONOMY IN WESTERN EUROPE 13 (Minority Rights Group ed., 1991). The Aland islanders
also have the advantage, of course, of living on islands, insulated from the mainland.
54. See John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary, Federation, Conflict-Regulation and Na-
tional and Ethnic Power-Sharing, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association 1-4 (Aug. 27, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Michigan Journal of International Law).
1336 [Vol. 25:1319
Sub-State Nationalism
government cannot unilaterally alter the horizontal division of powers,
the minority group enjoys some security in the exercise of collective
self-government. Of course, federations differ in the kinds of competen-
cies that the different levels have and the level of power they enjoy, and
the acceptability of a particular federal arrangement will depend on the
degree of mobilization of the national minority group, the kind of na-
tional identity that it evinces, and the type of powers and guarantees that
it possesses.
A second type of territorial autonomy involves the grant or devolu-
tion of power only to the region in which the minority is
demographically strongest, without changing the constitutional structure
of the State as a whole. Because the grant of autonomy does not affect
the federalization of the State as a whole, there is typically less security
for the minority in "federacy" or "partial federalization" arrangements.55
Examples include: the autonomous institutions established in the Aland
Islands; the UK devolution of power to Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland; the very limited form granted by France to Corsica in 1982; and
the South Tyrol region of Italy, among others.
One of the main concerns expressed by leaders of majority nations
or over-holding states with federalism and autonomy arrangements that
provide for collective self-government for minority nations within states
is that these institutional forms will lead to secession. This does not
seem to be borne out by the evidence, however. A major study of ethnic
conflict around the globe by Ted Gurr concludes that federal systems
have been an effective remedy for conflict in a significant number of
cases. 56 Michael Hechter in a recent book and John McGarry in a recent
study of institutional arrangements have both independently, and for dif-
ferent reasons, concluded that federal structures are helpful in dealing
with multi-nationality, and it is this (multi-nationality or diversity) that
57
poses a challenge to the state.
Although both kinds of internal political arrangements that promote
self-government by minority nationalists are vastly superior to a unitary
Jacobin state, from the point of view of most national minorities, neither
are wholly satisfactory. In part this is because the international order
privileges independent States, and it is less desirable to be a region
55. John McGarry, Autonomy (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Michi-
gan Journal of International Law/author).
56. See John McGarry, Federal Political Systems and National Minorities, in
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL COUNTRIES 2002 437 (Ann L. Griffiths ed., 2002); TED ROBERT
GURR, PEOPLES VERSUS STATES: MINORITIES AT RISK IN THE NEW CENTURY 208 (2000).
57. See generally, John McGarry, Must Pluri-National Federations Fail?, at 6 (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law/author); see
generally MICHAEL HECHTER, CONTAINING NATIONALISM (2000).
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within a State than to be a State, even when controlling for size, power,
and so on. Consider the cases of Ireland and Scotland. Both are similar
in size, but Ireland has more clout internationally and in the EU because
it is a State. This is a point made repeatedly by the Scottish Nationalist
Party in Scotland. 8
The principal disadvantage of multinational federation as a method
of meeting minority national aspirations, however, is that many states are
unlikely to concede it. Indeed, the minorities that need self-government
the most-those that are encapsulated in states that engage in egregious
violations of human rights, cultural repression, and ethnic cleansing-
are also the least likely to be granted any measure of collective self-
government. In some cases, minorities in such undemocratic States have
been granted autonomy arrangements, usually without altering the con-
stitutional structure of the State-but only following a minority
rebellion. Minorities have seized control of regions and the "granting" of
autonomy by the state has been a response to this de facto control. This
was true of the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq from 1991, Kosovo since
1997, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Trans-Dneistra, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
This phenomenon is related to a serious problem that attaches spe-
cifically to autonomy arrangements rather than to constitutional
federalism. That is, to the extent that autonomy arrangements are
"granted" at the "pleasure" of the majority group in the State, they are at
risk of being dissolved at the pleasure of the majority group or the State
as a whole. There is a symbolic and a very real problem attached to this
asymmetrical arrangement. The symbolic problem is that it indicates that
a lesser status attaches to the minority national group's exercise of self-
government. The very real problem is the lack of security that this pro-
vides to minority national groups. Indeed, in a number of cases,
autonomy arrangements have been rescinded by the State. Prominent
examples include Kosovo, which found its autonomy unilaterally ended
by Serbia in 1989; and the Sudan, which, in 1983, reneged on key ele-
ments of the 1972 autonomy settlement for the south.59
The incoherence and inadequacies of the current international law as
it applies to claims for collective self-determination ' , and the concerns
about a permissive right to secession to deal with this, have led Allen
58. See James Mitchell & Michael Cavanagh, Context and Contingency: Constitutional
Nationalists and Europe, in MINORITY NATIONALISM AND THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL
ORDER (Michael Keating & John McGarry eds., 2001).
59. Sudan proposed that the south be partitioned into three regions; that Islamic laws be
imposed on the whole country; and that former rebel troops be transferred to the north.
McGarry, supra note 55; TED ROBERT GURR, MINORITIES AT RISK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF
ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS 402 n.20 (1993).
60. See discussion supra Part I.
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Buchanan in a recent, important book, to argue for substantial forms of
self-government within the state, which he calls "intrastate autonomy
regimes." Indigenous peoples are his main example of the beneficiary of
such a regime, but the argument he develops seems to apply to any na-
tional minority group that has been and is currently unjustly treated.6
According to Buchanan, the international legal order should encour-
age alternatives to secession, in particular by working for greater
compliance with existing international human rights norms prohibiting
ethnic and religious discrimination and by supporting intrastate auton-
62omy regimes (self-government arrangements short of full sovereignty).
Underlying this strategy is the view that the international legal order has
a duty to support states' efforts to preserve their territorial integrity as
long as they do a credible job of protecting basic human rights. On this
view, the international legal order should be based on the protection of
human rights, and this requires either major reform of the U.N.-based
system of law or the development of alternative international institutions,
or both.
To make this effective, international law would need to distinguish
clearly between rights to secession and the legitimate interests that
groups have to intrastate autonomy, instead of the current very general
and contradictory treatments of "rights to autonomy of peoples" and
State rights to "territorial integrity." In addition, Buchanan argues for
international institutional mechanisms for mediation between majority
and minority national groups and a principled approach to recognition of
new States. He also argues that international legal protections of basic
human rights should be strengthened, and should include the legitimate
rights to self-determination, especially those that take a non-secessionist
form. These reforms are designed to make intrastate forms of self-
determination more attractive by strengthening the international role in
developing and guaranteeing internal autonomy arrangements.
Of course, in the absence of these kinds of guarantees, it is reason-
able for minority nationalists to fight for the more secure protection that
the international community affords to sovereign states, and reasonable
therefore to expect the conflict and violence associated with secessionist
minority nationalism to continue.
61. He does not specify the precise relationship between rectificatory justice (for his-
toric injustices) and contemporaneous justice (for current distributive injustices). See ALLEN
BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW 417 (2004).
62. Id. at 401-55.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has developed a number of distinct, albeit related argu-
ments. In Parts One and Two, the Article argued that national self-
determination has profound resonance across the globe and that minority
nationalists have very real and legitimate aspirations to be collectively
self-governing. Following from this, the Article argued that the interna-
tional community should develop a principled response to those claims
to collective self-determination.
The second half of the Article examined two methods of dealing
with these aspirations. The first was offering minority national commu-
61
nities cultural rights, or non-territorial autonomy, within existing states.
The second was for more robust forms of territorial autonomy, such as
federal arrangements of international autonomy regimes.64 The Article
argued that non-territorial autonomy was the most likely to be offered-
and in fact is currently on offer in a number of areas of majority-
minority tension-but it is unlikely to be satisfactory to minority nation-
alists, except in certain specified circumstances. The second is less likely
to be on offer by states, but is more likely to satisfy their aspirations,
especially if it is accompanied by robust international protection mecha-
nisms. Throughout this Part, the Article stressed the advantage, in the
current international system, of the status of statehood; and that non-
secessionist forms of self-determination need therefore to be accompa-
nied by some form of secure guarantee. In liberal democratic states,
which respect the rule of law, the constitutional entrenchment associated
with a federal system may be enough, depending on the degree of power
and autonomy that the minority enjoys. However, in other states, where
the threat that the autonomy will be rescinded is a very real one, interna-
tional involvement may be necessary.
63. See supra Section III.A.
64. See supra Section III.B.
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